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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
PLEWE CONSTRUCTION C 0 M-
PANY, a corporation, and THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, VERNAL ANDERSON, 
BILL HUNT and JOHN MAR-
SHALL, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7753 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 13, 1951 Vernal Anderson filed an ap-
plication with the Industrial Commission of Utah, in which 
he claimed that he was entitled to benefits under the 
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Workmen's Compensation Law for accidental injuries he 
sustained on January 11, 1951 at the construction site of 
the 13th Ward Chapel at 4th East and 1st South Streets 
in Salt Lake City. He made the application against the 
Plewe Construction Company, Bill Hunt and John Mar-
shall. He alleged that there was a dispute as to whether 
the Plewe Construction Company or Bill Hunt and John 
Marshall were his employer at the time of his accident. 
The Plewe Construction Company had its workmen's com-
pensation insurance in the State Insurance Fund. Bill Hunt 
and John IVIarshall did not have any workmen's compensa-
tion insurance on the date of Vernal Anderson's accident. 
In its decision and order of June 20, 1951 the Industrial 
Commission adopted the Referee's recommended findings 
of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that 
"Plewe Construction Company was an employer 
which procured shingling to be done in whole or in 
part for it by contractors or employees over whose 
work it retained supervision and control and that 
such work is a part and process of the general trade 
and business of Plewe Construction Company. 
"The Referee therefore concludes that an order 
of the Commission should issue requiring defend-
ants, Plewe Construction Company and the State 
Insurance Fund to pay all medical and hospital ex-
penses reasonably incurred by applicant in the treat-
ment of his injuries as aforesaid and compensation. 
* * * " 
Immediately preceding this quoted material the Ref-
eree gave his opinion that it was not necessary to find that 
Hunt and Marshall or Vernal Anderson, the injured man, 
were in fact employees of the constr.uction company. 
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The Industrial Commission ordered "the defendants" 
to pay Anderson's medical expenses and compensation. It 
is not entirely clear whether the Commission meant that 
all four defendants should make these payments, and if so 
in what order or what proportion, inasmuch as Hunt and 
Marshall had no compensation insurance but Plewe Con-
struction Company was insured by the State Insurance 
Fund. 
On July 10, 1951 the Plewe Construction and the State 
-~ Insurance Fund filed with the Industrial Commission an 
,. application for rehearing, which application was denied 
by the Commission on August 27, 1951. This certiorari pro-
ceeding is brought for the purpose of challenging the Com-
mission's decision and order requiring Plewe Construction 
Company and the State Insurance Fund to pay any amounts 
.( 
-~ 
cl 
relating to Vernal Anderson's injuries. 
The following facts were brought out in the evidence 
at the Industrial Commission's hearing. Plewe Construc-
tion Company had the general contract for construction 
of the 13th Ward Chapel. Some time about December, 1950, 
Mr. Plewe, the president of this company, saw an adver-
tisement in the Salt Lake Tribune which had been put in 
that paper by Hunt and Marshall. The advertisement read 
something like, "Roofs repaired" or "Leaky roofs fixed" 
(R. 40 and 52). The advertisement also contained John 
Marshall's telephone number. Mr. Plewe called that num-
ber on the phone and talked with Mr. Marshall. In that 
conversation and in a further conversation between Mr. 
Plewe, Mr. Marshall and Mr. Hunt the following day at the 
construction site, Hunt and Marshall assured Plewe that 
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they and other men whom they could procure were in a 
position to shingle the roof of the chapel right away. It 
was agreed that Hunt and Marshall would have the entire 
job of shingling the roof and they would be paid $3.25 per 
square, a square being 100 square feet. 
After Hunt and Marshall had been working alone on 
this shingling job awhile, Mr. Plewe said to them that the 
weather looked bad and he would like to have them get 
the other men they had mentioned in the beginning, so that 
the shingling job could be finished as soon as possible. 
Hunt and Marshall then put a want ad in the Salt Lake 
Tribune, reading something like, "Shinglers wanted," and 
giving Hunt's telephone number (R. 15 and 41). Anderson 
called Hunt on the telephone in the early morning of Jan-
uary 11, 1951 in response to the want ad. Hunt told him 
that if he wanted to do some shingling work he should meet 
him at 9:00 o'clock that morning at the 13th \Vard chapel. 
Anderson went to the chapel and talked to Marshall, who 
had arrived there before Hunt did that morning. After 
awhile Hunt came and Hunt, Marshall and Anderson went 
up on the roof. First they swept off some snow. Mr. Plewe 
came shortly. He and they and two of his carpenters put 
up a tarpaulin over the roof where the shingling was to 
be done. Within a few minutes after Anderson started 
shingling, he fell off the roof and was injured. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
VERNAL ANDERSON WAS NOT AN EM-
PLOYEE OF PLEWE CONSTRUCTION COlv.l:-
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PANY AND WAS NOT UNDER THAT COM-
PANY'S SUPERVISION OR CONTROL SO AS 
TO MAKE THAT COMPANY LIABLE FOR HIS 
ACCIDENTAL INJURY UNDER THE WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW. 
It is our contention that when Vernal Anderson re-
get ceived his accidental injury on January 11, 1951, he was 
:hat an employee of Hunt and Marshall, who were in partner-
lble. ship as an independent contractor; and the Industrial Com-
~ mission was in error in ordering anyone besides Hunt and 
am Marshall to pay compensation b~nefits to Mr. Anderson. 
~ 
There was not much substantial difference in the tes-
timony of the witnesses before the Industrial Commission t~ 
Ill on matters of fact, but there was some divergence of their 
• opinions on legal points. None of the four witnesses was 
a legal expert, so their legal opinions are not of much 
,:i:;: 
Me value. The main point on which the testimony of Mr. Hunt 
and Mr. Marshall differed was as to whether they were lJ~ 
ii"~i in partnership. Hunt testified that he did not consider 
that he and Marshall were partners ; but Marshall testified 
Il f~ 
that he considered that he and Hunt were in partnership 
!Ji'.'• 
:lJ"(; 
on their shingling jobs (R. 40 and 53). Their testimony did 
not differ materially as to the arrangements which they 
had made. Hunt and Marshall first met in 1950 when 
they were each doing shingling work on different houses 
of a certain housing project. They became acquainted and 
then decided to take shingling jobs together. They had 
completed several jobs prior to the one they took on the 
13th Ward Chapel. 
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Marshall's opinion that he and Hunt were in partner-
ship was probably correct. Their arrangements were that 
they would each share equally on the jobs they took, re-
gardless of the amount of work each one might do. This 
element of equal profits and losses is one of the most im-
portant in determining whether a partnership actually 
exists. In this connection, the letter which they sent to 
the Industrial Commission on March 5, 1951 over the sig-
natures of both Hunt and Marshall is interesting (R. 3). 
It reads: 
"We deny liability under the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act because Mr. Anderson was not 
our employee. His relationship to us was either 
partner or fellow employee of Plewe Construction 
Co." 
With respect to the legal status of Hunt and Marshall 
in their relationship with the Plewe Construction Company 
on the 13th Ward chapel, Mr. Plewe testified that Hunt 
and Marshall took a subcontract for the shingling job, the 
company to furnish the shingles, and Hunt and Marshall 
to furnish the labor for applying the shingles at an agreed 
price of $3.25 per square (R. 61 and 62). 
Hunt and Marshall both testified that they did not 
think they were independent contractors. Of course, it 
would be in their interest to be held as employees of Plewe 
Construction Company insofar as Mr. Anderson's accident 
and injuries are concerned. If the construction company 
and the State Insurance Fund are required to pay Mr. An-
dersons's compensation benefits, it will relieve Hunt and 
Marshall of that financial obligation. Aside from their 
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7 
monetary interest in the outcome of the case, the testimony 
of Mr. Hunt and Mr. l\1arshall shows the error of their lay 
opinion on the legal point in dispute in the case. Both of 
them indicated they thought that a party to a contract 
must furnish the materials as well as the labor in order 
to be constituted a subcontractor. We are not acquainted 
with any ruling of this Court ~hich would uphold their 
legal conclusion on that point. 
Mr. Anderson's attorney, throughout the hearing be-
fore the Industrial Commission, asked several questions 
of the witnesses relating to the "hiring" and the "wages" 
of Hunt and Marshall, apparently with the idea that if the 
witness said he was "hired" and received certain "wages," 
it would prove the existence of an employment relationship. 
Similarly he asked witnesses question about "supervision," 
"control," "instructions" and "directions" by the Plewe 
Construction Company and its agents. If the answers which 
the witnesses gave to these questions are analyzed, it can 
readily be seen that the instructions and directions and 
supervision and control by Plewe Construction Company 
were merely the specifications set forth orally by Mr. Plewe 
at the inception of the shingling contract. These specifi-
cations were that the shingles should be laid onejfourth 
inch apart and exposed to the weather 41j2 to 5 inches; 
lines should be drawn so that each row of shingles would 
be straight and even; and the wide shingles should be split 
before being nailed on, because if they were not so split the 
weather would split them. 
The Referee's conclusion that the Plewe ConstructiQn 
Company retained supervision and control over the shingl-
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ing job was based on an erroneous interpretation and ap-
plication of the following provision found in Section 42-1-40 
of the Workmen's Compensation Law: 
"Where any employer procures any work to be 
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over 
whose work he retains supervision or control, and 
such work is a part or process in the trade or busi-
ness of the employer, such contractor, and all per-
sons employed by him, and all subcontractors under 
him, and all persons employed by any such subcon-
tractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this 
section, employees of such original employer." 
In the same section, following the above quoted material 
is the further provision : 
"Any person, -firm or corporation engaged in 
the performance of work as an independent con-
tractor shall be deemed an employer within the 
meaning of this section. The term 'independent con-
tractor,' as herein used, is defined to be any person, 
association or corporation engaged in the perform-
ance of any work for another, who, while so engaged, 
is independent of the employer in all that pertains 
to the execution of the work, is not subject to the 
rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in 
the performance of a definite job or piece of work, 
and is subordinate to the employer only. in effecting 
a result in accordance with the employer's design." 
On several occasions this Court has held that the "sup-
ervision" and "control" mentioned in Section 42-1-40, means 
supervision and control over the manner or method of the 
performance of the work, in other words, "how" the con-
tractor does the details of the work. In our present case, 
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the few specifications which were made at the commence-
ment of Hunt and Marshall's shingling work were all aimed 
at "effecting a result in accordance with" Plewe Construc-
tion Company's design of having a good shingle roof in-
stalled on the building in accordance with the plans and 
specifications. Neither Herbert H. Plewe nor his brother 
exercised any supervision or control over the manner or 
method of Hunt and Marshall's shingling work. They did 
inspect the work for the purpose of determining whether 
~=: the specifications were being complied with, that is whether 
:!4( 
the shingles were being laid %Jhs of an inch apart and 
4% to 5 inches to the weather, and whether the bottoms 
of the shingles in each row were in a straight line, and 
whether the wide shingles were being split before they 
were nailed on. 
Nobody representing the Plewe Construction Company 
told Hunt or Marshall when they should commence work 
in the morning or how long they should work each day 
(R. 48). That shows one phase of their independence. AI-
~::;; though Hunt and Marshall agreed in advance that they 
[ :2.: 
;::: would get the shingling job finished as soon as possible, 
~::.: there was no date specified for the completion of the shingl-
·; :• ing job. 
··::~ Nobody instructed Hunt and Marshall how they were 
:~ 
to carry the bundles of shin.gles up the ladder or how many 
ttit~ they should carry on each trip. They were not told how 
.J1.~ they should carry their tools or in what manner they should 
hammer the nails, whether by long strokes or short taps~ 
n ili1: So far as Hunt and Marshall were concerned, all that th~ 
~H 
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Plewe Construction Company's representatives were inter-
ested in was to have a well shingled roof on the building 
after Hunt and Marshall had completed their contract. 
With respect to the tarpaulin on the roof, the Industrial 
Commission concluded that Mr. Plewe's offer and actions 
in putting up the tarpaulin for the purpose of keeping the 
roof dry was an evidence of supervision over the shinglers' 
work. The testimony is quite clear that 1\llr. Plewe offered 
to protect the roof and the shinglers from the inclement 
weather by means of the tarpaulin which belonged to the 
Plewe Construction Company. This was for the benefit 
of, and was an accommodation to, Hunt and Marshall and 
Vernal Anderson. Several men were needed to lift the 
tarpaulin to the desired position. After a conversation 
between Mr. Plewe and Mr. Marshall, (the words of which 
nobody seemed to remember) , Plewe and some of his car-
penters and Marshall and Anderson all assisted in install-
ing the tarpaulin (R. 64). 
A concise statement of the law point involved in this 
case is found in 58 American Jurisprudence, page 672, § 
139: 
"It is generally held that, for the purposes of 
workmen's compensation, an employee of a contrac-
tor or subcontractor is not to be considered an em· 
ployee of the principal employer or contractor, in 
the absence of any provision to that effect." 
Later in this brief we shall refer to some cases from 
. states other than Utah and compare them to the case at 
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bar. But first we feel that it is more important to mention 
several cases in which the Supreme Court of Utah has 
rendered decisions interpreting and applying the section 
of our law relating to "supervision and control" and "in-
dependent contractors," which are controlling in our pres-
ent case. 
One of the most recent Utah cases involving the inde-
pendent contractor relationship was Sommerville vs. Ind. 
Comm., 113 Utah 504, 196 Pac. 2d 718, (decided Aug. 3, 
1948). Sommerville was injured by an accident while he 
and his partner, Gardner, were doing some carpentry 
work on the gable end of a building owned by Ina Cook. 
The Court held that the preponderance of the evidence in-
dicated that Sommerville was an independent contractor. 
In that case, as in the case at bar, the injured man was 
working on a job where he was using his own tools, but 
the materials were furnished or paid for by the one who 
procured the independent contractor to do the work. Som-
merville and Gardner submitted their bill to Mrs. Cook 
and were paid for their work on the basis of $1.50 per 
hour for the completed job. At page 509 of the Utah citation, 
the Court's opinion says: 
"The preponderance of the evidence points to 
~··~ absence of right of control on the part of Mrs. Cook. 
She was interested only in the end result-that the 
Gr repairs be accomplished. She was not interested in 
~-:: the manner in which plaintiff and Gardner accom-
plished this end." 
~: The cases of Christean vs. Ind. Comm., 113 Utah 451, 
!tll 196 Pac. 2d 502, and Stover Bedding Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 
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99 Utah 423, 107 Pac. 2d 1027, 134 A. L. R. 1006, which 
are cited in the Sommerville case, both dealt with the status 
of salesmen. The majority opinion in each case held that 
the salesman was an independent contractor, but the fac-
tual situation in those cases was not so similar to that in 
our present case as was the Sommerville case and the 
earlier one of Parkinson vs. Ind. Comm., 110 Utah 309, 
172 Pac. 2d 136. At page 311 of the Utah citation the 
Court's opinion contains the following: 
"As stated by this court in Luker Sand & Gravel 
Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 82 Utah 188, 23 Pac. 2d 225: 
"Whether or not one engaged in a service for 
another is an employee or an independent contractor, 
within the meaning of the Industrial Act, is a jur-
isdictional question, presenting a situation which 
requires this court to determine the status from the 
facts submitted from a preponderance of the evi-
dence * * *" 
"Hence the determination of the question of 
whether Molyneaux was an employee within the 
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act will 
determine whether the Industrial Commission had 
jurisdiction of the case." 
Briefly, the facts in the Parkinson case were that Mr. 
Molyneaux was injured while he was preparing to haul a 
truck load of coke to the W oolsulate plant, which was op-
erated by Parkinson. Molyneaux had made an agreement 
with Parkinson to haul coke from two suppliers in Utah to 
the Woolsulate plant at Midvale and he was to be paid a 
fixed amount per ton for each load. The plant's operations 
required a minimum of 35 ton per week, but Molyneaux 
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\ was allowed to haul all the coke he wanted to, within the 
s: capacity of the plant to store it. The Industrial Commission 
t: decided that Molyneaux was an "employee," but the Su;.; 
~: preme Court reversed the Commission and held that Moly-
neaux was an independent contractor. Among other ele-
~: ments of the contract, the Court mentioned that Molyneaux 
was not required to haul for Woolsulate exclusively and 
:::· that he was free to choose the days on which he did the 
hauling. At page 315 of the Court's opinion is found the 
following language : 
"We are of the opinion from all the facts and 
circumstances of this case that the company did not 
have the control of Molyneaux contemplated by the 
statute to make the relationship that of employer-
employee. The facts that the company could de-
termine the place where the work was to be done 
and had the right t.o discharge Molyneaux at any 
time without contractual liability are not controlling. 
Anyone employing an independent contractor, such 
as a plumber or a building contractor, has the right 
to determine where he wants the work to be done. 
It is when the employer can not only determine 
where the work shall be done but how it should be 
executed that the relationship is that of employer-
employee." 
Ewer vs. Ind. Comm., 112 Utah 538, 189 Pac. 2d 959, 
is another recent case in which this Court held that a man 
::-~: was an independent contractor and not an employee, even 
though the materials, (sewer pipe), were furnished by the 
one with whom he contracted, and the independent con-
=:·' 
tractor was to be paid for his services on a footage basis. 
c;;: 
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Included in the Industrial Commission's order deny-
ing the application for rehearing, (R. 78, 79 and 80), sev-
eral citations were mentioned for the purpose of supporting 
the Commission's conclusions. We shall refer to that part 
of the order as the Commission's brief. Most of those 
citations are not applicable to our present case, because 
of the differences in the factual situations or in the stat-
utory provisions involved. For example, the Commission's 
brief refers to 105 A. L. R. 580. That volume and page 
commences a discussion of several Louisiana cases. They 
mention that the Louisiana workmen's compensation law 
provides that any person, referred to in the section as 
principal, who should undertake to execute any work which 
is a part of his trade, business, occupation, or which he 
has contracted to perform, and who contracts with any 
person for the execution of the whole or any part of such 
work, should be liable for compensation to any employee 
engaged therein to the same extent that he would have 
been, had the employee been employed directly by him. 
The Louisiana provision does not require the existence of 
"supervision and control," as does the Utah statutory pro-
vision. 
The Commission's brief (R. 79) also refers to the 
Connecticut case of Bello vs. Notkins, 124 Atl. 831, 101 
Conn. 34, which deals with a statutory provision differing 
from Utah's. That case involved Section 5345 of the Con-
necticut workmen's compensation law: 
"When any principal employer procures any 
work to be done, wholly or in part for him, by a 
contractor, or through him by a subcontractor, and 
the work so procured to be done is a part or process 
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in the trade or business of such principal employer, 
and is performed in, on or about premises under 
his control, then such principal employer shall be 
liable to pay all compensation under this chapter 
to the same extent as if the work were done without 
the intervention of such contractor or subcontrac-
.. , tor." 
:. 
At this point we would like to inform the Court that 
if the Utah workmen's compensation act had included a 
provision such as is found in the Louisiana and Connecticut 
law's above mentioned, we would have paid Vernal Ander-
son's claim and not brought the case to the Supreme Court 
for review. 
The Arizona case of Grabe vs. Ind. Comm., 38 Ariz. 
322, 299 Pac. 1031, mentioned by the Commission, (R. 80), 
did involve a statutory provision practically the same as 
ours, but the factual situation was quite dissimilar to the 
case at bar. The original employer, A. C. Grabe, owned 
or leased a brickyard. He had covered all of the brickyard 
employees under a workmen's compensation policy, on 
which he paid premiums for more than three years prior 
to an accident suffered by a man named Castro. Grabe's 
policy expired just prior to Castro's accident. Grabe re-
ported Castro's accident to the Arizona Industrial Com-
mission on the usual form. At the Industrial Commission 
hearing, Grabe testified that he had contracted the making 
of bricks ~o Jose Romo and paid Romo at the rate of $2.25 
per thousand for bricks made. Romo hired the men he 
needed and paid them out of this money. The injured man, 
Castro, was one of the men Romo had hired. Grabe's own 
t~stimony at the hearing showed that he retained the right 
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of control over the "manner and method" of Ramo's opera-
tions. Consequently Grabe was held liab~e for compensation 
benefits to Castro. 
We have found two cases from states other than Utah, 
in which the injured party was a shingler. 
Nollett vs. Holland Lumber Co., 4 N. W. 2d 554, was 
a Nebraska case decided in 1942. Number 6 of the syllabus 
briefly summarizes the case : 
"Where decedent and another were employed as 
a team by a company engaged in the business of 
selling roofs, to apply roofing at a spe·cified price 
per square and furnished their own tools and equip-
ment without direction by company as to the man-
ner of erecting scaffolding or attaching ladders so 
as to insure safety of the workmen, decedent was an 
"independent contractor" and not entitled to bene-
fits under the workmen's compensation law." 
Thompson vs. Braselton Federal Insulating & Build-
ing Materials Co., 223 Pac. 2d 527, was an Oklahoma case 
decided in 1950. Number 4 of the syllabus briefly sum-
marizes the case : 
"Where compensation claimant had been en-
gaged in roofing work and took jobs where he found 
them, and hired his son and another to help repair 
dwelling on which claimant was injured, and claim-
ant was paid at specified rate per square, claimant 
was an independent contractor, and fact that claim-
ant had been requested to work on Labor Day, the 
day of his injury, so that alleged employer could 
weatherstrip next day, did not change his status so 
as to entitle him to compensation." 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the award of the Industrial 
Commission against Plewe Construction and The State In-
surance Fund should be annulled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
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